I had a thesis: The pandemic boom in camping and water sports is over. Find a stock that didn’t get the memo and sell it short in the hopes of making a profit on the decline. I thought I had found such an overpriced nugget in the form of Patrick Industries (PATK), an Elkhart, Indiana maker of a lot of stuff that goes into recreational vehicles, recreational boats, and recreational powersports. It’s fairly, um, recreational, and therefore totally discretionary. They also have a division that makes parts for the housing industry.
The days of social distancing are over. Camping and water sports had an incredible two-year run. Remember “glamping”? That seemed to pass from our lexicon faster than ayahuasca at a sweat lodge. Thor Industries (THO), one of the biggest RV makers, saw sales increase from $8 billion in 2020 to over $16 billion in 2022. Thor will do well to exceed $10 billion in 2024. Meanwhile, Patrick’s stock price put the hammer down on Thor. PATK is up 273% over five years and 90% over the past twelve months. Is Patrick a stock that I would sell short? No.
Patrick will have sales of about $3.6 billion in 2024. It trades at about 21 times earnings with a market capitalization of $3.2 billion. The enterprise value to EBITDA multiple for PATK is 11 and the company generates over $350 million in free cash flow per year. Most importantly, Patrick seems to be pretty good at acquisitions, spending about $1.8 billion over the past six years. Take Sportech, for example. Patrick acquired the company in January for $315 million from a private equity firm.
Sportech, of Elk River, Minnesota generated revenue of $255 million in 2023. Based on the pro forma numbers in the Patrick 10-Q, it looks like Sportech generated about $26 million of EBITDA during the first six months of 2024, so it seems like Patrick paid a multiple of around 6 times EBITDA. The public markets give Patrick a multiple above 10 times EBITDA, so presto-chango you have a nice return on the investment without doing any heavy lifting.
Now, if you take out Sportech, the results at Patrick for the first half of 2024 were flat-to-down. Net sales excluding the acquisition would have been $1.8 billion for the first six months of 2024 which is slightly below the levels of 2023. The acquisition machine needs to keep rolling at Patrick in order to keep the shares elevated. This seems possible – Patrick may offer a sanctuary for beleaguered suppliers to the RV and marine industry. If the boom is over, Patrick may be able to swoop up some more acquisitions at bargain prices.
Just for grins, I decided to conduct a rough valuation of Patrick using steady-state income and capitalizing the free cash flow by the weighted average cost of capital. Bruce Greenwald would call this an “earnings power valuation”. I employed a weighted average cost of capital of 7.63% on free cash flow of $373 million to arrive at a value of $4.9 billion. Subtracting debt of $1.5 billion and adding cash of $43 million results in an EPV of $3.4 billion – roughly in-line with the current market cap.
Shorting a stock requires a steely certainty that the company is either a. An unsustainable bubble, or b. Engaging in some kind of accounting deception. Patrick meets neither criteria. Do, I think Patrick could be heading down the road of making unwise acquisitions simply to paper over underlying weakness in the core business? It’s possible. Returns on capital have dwindled (see appendix) to the high single-digit levels. Is that the result of overpaying for some businesses, or simply the cyclical trough the industry faces? Hard to say, but I wouldn’t try to bet against management.
Right on cue, the RV industry received a jolt this morning with the release of a report by Hunterbrook Media accusing Winnebago (WGO) of selling defective RVs and a looming warranty crisis. PATK dropped about 3.5% on the news. It may be something. Or not.
Tripper: Important announcement – Some hunters have been seen in the woods near Piney Ridge trail and the fish and game commission has raised the legal kill limit on campers to three. So, if you’re hiking today, please wear something bright and keep low.
Appendix: Patrick Industries operating results 2017-2024 TTM to June 30 with associated returns on capital.
Are the Cornhuskers back? They seemed unstoppable in the first half. Fun times. The stadium was electric. The second half was a little underwhelming. I’m not so sure about the post-game field invasion by the students. Let’s hold off the pandemonium until we get some bigger wins under our belt. Despite all the flashy antics from the Sanders family, Colorado probably just wasn’t that good.
I rushed the field on a freezing November afternoon in 1991. We came from behind to beat Oklahoma. It was a Big 8 championship. In a testament to just how good our offensive lines were during the Osborne era, our quarterback on that day was neither Gill, Frazier, Crouch, nor Frost. Not even Gdowski. It was none other than the merely adequate Keithen McCant. Of course, he was backed in the I-formation by the Omaha Central grad, Calvin Jones. The future All-American 200-lb machine was only in his sophomore year.
Looking around Memorial Stadium, it is readily apparent that Nebraska is truly dependent upon agriculture. You can’t miss all those seed and insecticide banners among the flashing Dororthy Lynch signs. We tend to forget this in Omaha. We’re an ag state, but lately the state of ag isn’t so great. Corn at $4 a bushel won’t buy you much name, image and likeness recognition.
You might think that the ethanol business would be a good place right now. Reasonable gasoline prices and lower corn input costs should help the ethanol producers improve their margins. Unfortunately, Omaha’s Green Plains (GPRE) doesn’t seem to be heading in the right direction. The company is losing money and they are the subject of an activist investor campaign seeking to liquidate the business.
GPRE trades around book value; they’ve got some debt but it is mostly in the form of low-rate convertible notes. I think someone with better industry knowledge can decipher whether or not the stock is bargain at it’s nearly 52-week lows. It would have to be someone who can conduct a sum-of-the-parts valuation. I decided to not hurt my brain too much and search for a profitable ethanol producer instead.
REX American Resouces (REX) seems to be the kind of ethanol investment that makes sense. The Dayton, Ohio company has a market cap near $750 million and zero debt. They had nearly $350 million of cash on hand at the end of July, and they are currently plowing profits into a plant expansion. Sales run about $800 milion per year with gross profits approaching $100 million last year. Operating margins for the fiscal year ending Janaury 2024 were above 8%. I generally dislike businesses that rely on government mandates to sustain their operations, but with nearly 40% of all corn being grown for ethanol it seems unlikely that the program will ever be ended.
REX plans to spend $150 million to expand its One Earth facility in Illinois. At the end of January 2024, entities affiliated with REX shipped approximately 716 million gallons of ethanol over the preceding 12 month period, of which 290 million gallons can be attributed to the parent company. Most imporantly, REX is generating returns on capital in excess of 30%. The strong balance sheet allows the company a wide berth to weather another cyclical turn in the corn and energy markets. The stock is trading well below it’s highs from earlier this year. REX looks like an attractive investment.
Peakstone Realty Trust
I’m still gnawing away at my Peakstone Realty Trust (PKST) analysis. The company has a market cap of $500 million and currently yields slightly less than 7%. They have a marquis client roster with a focus on industrial warehouses, and (gasp) office space. Peakstone has about $1.4 billion of debt to go with $2.5 billion of (undepreciated) real estate, but most of the interest rates are capped in the 4.5% range. The weighted average life of remaining lease terms exceeds seven years, so there is a long runway here. The company has sold off some troubled office. This one’s not for the faint of heart, but if you had to make a bet on babies being thrown out with bathwater, you should consider PKST.
Total net operating income for the trailing twelve months was $191.8 million. I capitalized these amounts by sector using 6.5% for industrial, 7.5% for “other,” and 20% for office and arrived at an asset value of $1.73 billion. Subtract the debt and add the ample cash balance of $461 million, and the net asset value is nearly $800 million. The stock is selling for $13.70 and the assets seem to pencil at $21 a share. You might even call this a margin of safety.
These aren’t self-storage facilities in Hastings, people. We’re talking Amazon warehouses here. The office? You’ve got the Freeport McMoRan HQ building in Phoenix, for example. Class A stuff. Is there more downside in office? Maybe. Is a 20% cap rate something I just pulled out of the air? A little bit. Certainly, the next step is to evaluate the office portfolio on a building-by-building basis and decide what is a zero and what is valuable. There’s also this troubling notion of the market being fairly efficient most of the time, and 25 cents aren’t just lying around waiting to be picked up. But sometimes that quarter on the ground really is there for the taking.
At the risk of sounding like Jimmy Carter, I felt a sense of malaise at this year’s commercial real estate summit. Last week, the Omaha conference reached its 35-year milestone under the guidance and creativity of the indefatigable attorney and developer, Jerry Slusky. Maybe it was the panel discussion that devolved into career counseling for young brokers by a grizzled veteran. Perhaps it was the lack of statistics on rental trends and square footage absorption, leading a developer to wanly muse about seeking out markets where “demand exceeds supply.” This revelation produced solemn nods and much chin-stroking from the pilgrims.
Lenders assured me that none of their loan books had the faintest whiff of distress, yet a panel on the subject implied otherwise. One general contractor told me that many of his clients in the southwestern portion of the US are going ahead with apartment projects “even though the numbers don’t work” because they know they are locking in today’s cost basis for the future. I had no response to this business plan. Using such logic, one could have made this justification to move forward on a real estate development at virtually any moment in the past 75 years.
It was the irascible Creighton economist Ernie Goss who brought out the wet blanket. I love an economist who is one-handed. There aren’t many. Dr. Goss gamely mixed John Maynard Keynes with Warren Zevon, befitting a professor who could pass for Bob Dylan’s cousin. Goss talked about the agricultural sector in gloomy tones. Corn at $4 a bushel is no bueno for Nebraska. His most sobering reminder was the chart showing that interest on the national debt now exceeds spending on national defense. No empires have survived this inflection point. All that Aztec bullion filled Spain’s coffers for two centuries before an overextended domain began to unravel in the late 1800’s. France sold its New World colonies to pay for Napoleon’s conquests. Lest one thinks such fate can’t befall the holder of the world’s reserve currency, it was Britain with her once-invincible pound sterling that was hobbled by two world wars and went cap-in-hand for an IMF bailout in 1976. George Soros heaped further ignominy on the beleaguered pound in 1992.
I can be prone to cynicism. It’s a blind spot, and an especially poor trait in a real estate developer where one’s raison d’etre is the rosy future. But I can’t help but feel there is a bit of the “end-of-the-Roman-Empire” feeling around. There’s bacchanalia galore with stock indexes hitting all time highs, private jets whisking families on vacation, the return of the Hummer, liquor lockers at private clubs, multiple country club memberships, CNBC masquerading as due diligence, billions of dollars in NIL money for college athletes, the de-facto legalization of THC and sports gambling, and Nebraska finally going all-in on it’s own casino gambling. Meanwhile, the low end of the income spectrum faces insurmountable home-ownership costs and pain in the grocery aisle. There are two wars being waged on the doorstep of NATO, a former president was nearly assassinated, and the current president all-but-admitted he was too senile to serve another term. And yet! And yet. What’s the VIX at? 100? Nope, try a benign 15.79. Credit continues to flow. Jerome Powell just declared victory. Game on.
You’re starting to ramble. Are you turning into an old man? Well, I don’t think of myself that way, but in actuarial terms the answer is unfortunately, “yes”. But there’s a place for old men. I’m not talking about ending up like Sheldon Levene in Glengarry Glen Ross. I’m envisioning Clint Eastwood here. Cigar and a Smith & Wesson. Let’s take another wise old Omaha guy I like – Warren Buffett. Berkshire Hathaway owns $235 billion of Treasury bills after significantly reducing holdings of Apple. Buffett may be old, but he’s not cynical. I can’t recall an annual meeting where the words “America’s best days lie ahead” weren’t uttered. However, in this instance, I prefer to watch what the man does, not what he says.
Dude, this is bumming me out, and your Hollywood references are beta. Let’s move along to that book you’re reading.
Ok. I’m about halfway through Nate Silver’s On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything. It’s a fun read, but I think Silver could have used a better editor (pot, meet kettle). We follow his poker exploits, head down his sports betting rabbit-hole, take a tour of the venture capital industry, and then make an off-road excursion into the bizarre downfall of Sam Bankman-Fried. These are members of “The River,” Silver’s term for those who think in terms of probabilities and make wagers using their best estimates of positive expected value (EV). Yet, so much of what passes for rigorous evaluation of odds based on massive amounts of data often coalesces into little more than well-informed gut instincts. Silver seems to recognize this despite his continued attempts to explain most decisions in probabilistic terms. Take bluffing, for instance. Poker players smoke out a weak hand with a massive bet. Brute intimidation can often work better than the best statistical calculator. Venture capitalists are guilty of herd mentality and they have been conned by the likes of Adam Naumann and Elizabeth Holmes more often than they care to admit.
I am not a mathematician, and my knowledge of statistics is only good enough to read a Nassim Taleb book without a thesaurus. Nor am I a gambler. However, one character seems to be missing from Silver’s book – the 18th century Swiss mathematician Daniel Bernoulli. Silver relegates him to the footnotes. It was Bernoulli who first started to ask why people didn’t take certain bets, even though the probability might yield a positive expected value. Bernoulli figured out that the value of a bet was in direct proportion to the utility of the additional wealth to be gained. A rich man probably wouldn’t take long odds if it meant a major loss of capital, but a poor man has little to lose on a longshot. If you want a great discussion of Bernoulli and his role in finance, pick up The Missing Billionaires by Victor Haghani and James White.
Silver brushes right past Bernoulli’s revolutionary discovery. In a parenthetical aside, he writes “If you had a net worth of $1 million, would you gamble it all on a one-in-50 chance of winning $200 million and a 98 percent chance of having to start over from scratch? The EV of the bet is $3 million, but I probably wouldn’t.” Probably wouldn’t?!?! How about “no way”! Unless you are very young and have immense confidence that you can re-earn your million-dollar nest-egg, you’re not going to take that bet.
The marginal utility of wealth is critical to understanding the business wagers called “investments.” A venture capitalist on Sand Hill Road with $200 billion of assets under management will not agonize over staking $20 million on an AI-powered start-up that automates logistics in warehouses if it has a chance for asymmetrical upside returns. A solo investor with a net worth of $20 million would never take on such a venture alone, despite his or her immense personal wealth. Kahnemann and Tversky famously uncovered the psychology behind such thinking. Humans are risk averse. Most of the time expected pain of loss is greater than the appeal of a gain.
All of this talk of Bernoulli and wagering based on one’s wealth rather than simply the expected value of a bet reminds me of another Warren Buffett gem: When discussing the failure of Long-Term Capital Management which was headed by Nobel laureates and nearly brought markets to a standstill in 1998, Buffett remarked:
But to make money they didn’t have and didn’t need, they risked what they did have and did need. That is foolish. That is just plain foolish. It doesn’t make any difference what your IQ is. If you risk something that is important to you for something that is unimportant to you it just does not make any sense. I don’t care whether the odds are 100 to 1 that you succeed or 1000 to 1 that you succeed. If you hand me a gun with a million chambers in it, and there’s one bullet in a chamber and you said, “Put it up to your temple. How much do want to be paid to pull it once,” I’m not going to pull it. You can name any sum you want, but it doesn’t do anything for me on the upside and I think the downside is fairly clear. So I’m not interested in that kind of a game. Yet people do it financially without thinking about it very much.
I think we’ll leave it here for now. Coming soon… I have crunched some more numbers on Peakstone Realty Trust (PKST), and I think it trades at a 30% discount to it’s net asset value. You also get a 6% dividend while you wait. Elsewhere, Iron Mountain (IRM) seems to be infected with the same kind of data center hype that is artificially buoying the legacy data center stocks Digital Realty Trust (DLR) and Equinix (EQX) – companies that inflate their earnings by minimizing their depreciation and distorting operating cash flow by attributing far too much weight of capital expenditures to “growth” vs “maintenance”. Finally, I ran some numbers on Carnival Cruises (CCL) with the thesis that it would make a good short. It’s leveraged to the hilt. There were no COVID bailouts for cruise operators who are domiciled in tax-havens. Sorry, you can’t have it both ways. It seems I am wrong about CCL. Barring a major consumer slowdown (not entirely out of the question), the stock seems fairly valued. Until next time.